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Abstract
Alcohol dependence (AD) manifests as a strong drive to consume alcohol despite seri-
ous adverse consequences. A popular theory in addiction research thus suggests that
AD is characterized by a shift from goal-directed to habitual control, where actions
are automatic and disentangled from outcomes. Evidence for this has mainly been
drawn from experimental investigations in animals, with comparably little transla-
tion of these procedures to humans. Whereas these paradigms relate to behavioral
psychology, the field of machine learning has recently advanced new experiments that
allow the application of reinforcement learning algorithms to investigate a shift to-
wards habits. Again, these tasks have yet not been applied to human AD. Moreover
it remains unclear how experiments from these diverse fields relate to each other.
To fill this gap, this thesis investigates habitual at the expense of goal-directed con-
trol from distinct theoretical fields in AD patients. We adapted a Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental transfer (PIT) procedure from the animal literature, which quantifies
habits as cue-induced control over behavior (Paper I). Then, we applied an experimen-
tal procedure inspired from machine learning (Two-Step task) that allows to inves-
tigate the balance between habitual and goal-directed control (Paper II). Third, we
examined the relationship between behavior across these paradigms (Paper III). Last,
we investigated whether the imbalance between habitual and goal-directed control was
associated with alcohol consumption in non-pathological, social drinkers (Paper IV).
We observed the following results:(1) AD was associated with increased cue-induced
habits, as measured by the PIT task.(2) AD patients showed a selective shift away
from goal-directed control in the Two-Step task. In line with these findings,(3)
healthy controls who showed enhanced habits in the PIT task, demonstrated re-
ductions in goal-directed control in the Two-Step task.(4) Alcohol consumption in
non-pathological drinkers was not associated with an imbalance between habitual
and goal-directed control in the Two-Step paradigm.
Our results add further evidence that AD is associated with a shift from goal-directed
to habitual control, e.g. increased cue-induced control / reductions in goal-directed
decision-making. In healthy controls, these phenomena were associated with each
other, suggesting the involvement of similar mechanisms. As non-pathological alco-
hol intake was not associated with an imbalance between goal-directed and habitual
control, this imbalance might arise over the course of AD rather than being a trait
marker of alcohol intake.
i
Zusammenfassung
Alkoholabha¨ngigkeit (AA) zeichnet sich durch einen starken Drang nach Alkoholkon-
sum trotz schwerwiegender negativer Folgen aus. Eine ga¨ngige Theorie aus der
Suchtforschung besagt deshalb, dass AA mit einer Verlagerung von zielgerichteter zu
habitueller Kontrolle einhergeht, durch welche Handlungen automatisiert ausgefu¨hrt
werden und weitgehend unabha¨ngig von ihren Folgen sind. Belege fu¨r diese Theorie
stammen weitgehend aus experimentellen Untersuchungen an Tieren, welche nur un-
zureichend auf den Menschen u¨bertragen wurden. Wa¨hrend diese Paradigmen dem
Gebiet der Verhaltenspsychologie entstammen, hat das Fachgebiet des maschinellen
Lernens ku¨rzlich neue Experimente hervorgebracht, welche die Anwendung von Algo-
rithmen des besta¨rkenden Lernens erlauben, um habituelle Kontrolle zu untersuchen.
Auch diese Paradigmen fanden bisher keine Anwendung in der Untersuchung von
Patienten, die an AA leiden. Zudem ist unklar, wie die Paradigmen aus den unter-
schiedlichen theoretischen Disziplinen miteinander assoziiert sind.
Um diese Lu¨cke zu fu¨llen, widmet sich diese Dissertation der Untersuchung von
habituellem und zielgerichtetem Verhalten bei AA aus unterschiedlichen Perspek-
tiven. Hierfu¨r adaptierten wir zuna¨chst ein Pawlowsch-Instrumentelles Transfer (PIT)
Paradigma aus der Tierliteratur, durch welches habituelles Verhalten als reizges-
teuerte Kontrolle quantifiziert wird (Paper I). Anschließend nutzten wir eine Aufgabe
(Two-Step), die aus dem maschinellen Lernen stammt und die Untersuchung der Bal-
ance von habitueller und zielgerichteter Kontrolle ermo¨glicht (Paper II). Drittens
untersuchten wir den Zusammenhang des Verhaltens ber beiden Paradigmen hin-
weg (Paper III). Zuletzt untersuchten wir, ob jene Balance mit dem Alkoholkonsum
in sozialen Trinkern - welche die Diagnose AA nicht erfu¨llen - assoziiert ist (Paper
IV).
Die folgenden Hauptergebnisse wurde gefunden:(1) AA war assoziert mit erho¨htem
reizinduziertem habituellem Verhalten, gemessen mit der PIT Aufgabe.(2) AA Patien-
ten zeigten selektive Verminderung im zielgerichteten Verhalten in der Two-Step Auf-
gabe.(3) Jene gesunden Probanden, die erho¨htes reizgesteuertes habituelles Verhalten
in der PIT Aufgabe zeigten, zeichneten sich durch verminderte zielgerichtete Kontrolle
in der Two-Step Aufgabe aus.(4) Alkoholkonsum von sozialen nicht-pathologischen
Trinkern war nicht assoziiert mit dem Ungleichgewicht zwischen habituellem und ziel-
gerichtetem Verhalten in der Two-Step Aufgabe.
Diese Ergebnisse liefern weitere Hinweise auf eine Verlagerung von zielgerichteter
zu habitueller Kontrolle bei AA (versta¨rktes reizgesteuertes habituelles Verhalten/
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verminderte zielgerichtete Entscheidungsfa¨higkeit). Bei gesunden Probanden waren
diese Pha¨nomene miteinander assoziiert, was darauf ru¨ckschließen la¨sst, dass sie
a¨hnliche kognitive Mechanismen rekrutieren. Der Nullbefund bzgl. Alkoholkon-
sum bei sozialen Trinkern und dem Ungleichgewicht zwischen habitueller und ziel-
gerichteter Entscheidungskontrolle weist darauf hin, dass eine Verlagerung von ziel-
gerichteter zu habitueller Kontrolle erst im Verlauf der AA entsteht und kein Korrelat
von Alkoholkonsum per se darstellt.
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Why is it possible to want, what is not expected to be liked, nor
remembered to be liked and not actually liked when obtained?
(Berridge, 2012)
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Introduction
Habits are automatized behaviors that can be triggered by environmental cues (Dick-
inson, 1985). Habits bring tremendous benefits in our everyday lives, as they allow
to efficiently perform action routines, while requiring minimal cognitive effort (Gillan
et al., 2016). Without our ability to execute habits we were unable to lace our shoes
in the morning while concurrently discussing the dinner plans with our partner. How-
ever, the downside of habits is, that these actions are rather inflexible. This is why
the shoe lacing becomes difficult when one hand is injured. This condition forces us
to suppress automatic action tendencies and to apply cognitive control to each step
of the shoe lacing technique just as when we learnt this procedure for the very first
time. In situations like these, we need to override our habits by applying more de-
liberative and flexible goal-directed behavior. The ability to override habits has been
suggested to be impaired in alcohol dependence (AD) (Everitt and Robbins, 2005),
where maladaptive behavior is characterized by resistance to change. Indeed, AD
patients continue to drink alcohol despite serious adverse consequences such as social
isolation, unemployment or alcohol related delinquency (Volkow and Li, 2004) and
even if the consumption causes negative emotional responses or anhedonia (Berridge,
2012). These habits can interfere with goal-directed intentions (Dolan and Dayan,
2013), for example, when patients wish to abstain from alcohol. Habits at the ex-
pense of goal-directed control might thus contribute to the chronicity of the disorder,
with relapse rates up to 85% (Boothby and Doering, 2005). Therefore, the iden-
tification of the biological and cognitive mechanisms of habit formation in AD is a
promising target for the development of new pharmacological and psychotherapeutic
interventions.
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Theoretical Background
Initial alcohol intake is mostly associated with hedonic, pleasurable effects (Cun-
nigham et al., 1993). As actions that result in reward become more likely to re-
occur (Thorndike, 1898), alcohol consumption can be seen as conditioned response,
acquired through action-outcome associations. However, AD is defined by a persis-
tence of this acquired response, even when alcohol consumption has lost its reinforc-
ing effects. This is reminiscent of habits, where behavior is strongly automatized
and insensitive to its associated outcome (Dickinson, 1985; Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
Habitual alcohol intake in AD has been argued to rely on an imbalance between
two decision-making systems (Everitt and Robbins, 2005). There are different the-
oretical formulations on how these decision-making systems operate in humans and
a distinction between two theories was framed, that I will henceforth refer to as
psychological and computational approach. The psychological framework refers to
phenomena and paradigms that are grounded in the animal literature and fall within
the field of behavioral psychology. Within this field, conventional statistical models
are applied that allow descriptive characterization of habit phenomena. The com-
putational framework, on the other hand refers to phenomena and paradigms that
derive from machine learning. Within this field, generative, algorithmic models of be-
havior are applied and provide mechanistic accounts on the underlying computations
of habit phenomena (Stephan et al., 2015). Importantly, both multiple-control frame-
works consistently implicate that AD is accompanied by a shift from goal-directed
to habitual control (Lucantonio et al., 2014; Huys et al., 2016; Robbins and Everitt,
1999). In humans, there are comparably little investigations that test this theoret-
ical assumption. One major goal of this dissertation was therefore to test whether
AD is indeed accompanied by a dominant habit system at the expense of a reflective
goal-directed system. We tested this by using two different paradigms that relate to
the psychological and computational framework, respectively. Furthermore, a second
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goal was to test, whether these two dual-system accounts are indeed related. More-
over, as there is evidence that a shift towards habit formation in AD does not only
reflect a consequence but also a cause of chronic alcohol intake (Redish et al., 2008),
a third aim was to test whether alcohol consumption in social drinkers, who had not
been exposed to long-term alcohol intake was associated with an imbalance between
habitual and goal-directed control.
2.1 Goals and habits: a psychological perspective
According to a psychological multiple-control account, actions can be either automat-
ically elicited by external cues (habitual) or guided by the anticipated consequences
of an action (goal-directed). Crucially, a shift from goal-directed to habitual con-
trol in AD might rely on two mechanisms: Enhanced cue-triggered responses and/or
disruption of goal-directed behavior through inadequate outcome anticipation.
2.1.1 Cue-triggered responses in AD
In AD, alcohol cues cause strong physiological responses (Beck et al., 2012; Carter and
Tiffany, 1999), which are related to self-reports of craving (Wrase et al., 2007; Hogarth
et al., 2010) and may cause automatic approach behavior towards these cues (Barkby
et al., 2012; Wiers et al., 2011). These cue-induced motivations in AD likely reflect
conditioned appetitive responses, which are a result of Pavlovian reward learning. Ev-
idence for this comes from microdialysis studies in animals, which demonstrate that
after chronic alcohol intake, alcohol cues lead to increased dopamine release in the
nucleus accumbens (NcAcc) (Katner et al., 1996). Likewise, after stimulus-stimulus
learning, non-drug related, reward predictive stimuli lead to increased dopaminergic
transmission in the midbrain (Schultz et al., 1997). Alcohol itself increases dopamine
concentration in the midbrain and the NcAcc, just as other natural rewards like food
or sex (Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Boileau et al., 2003). Thus, in AD alcohol associ-
ated cues may become conditioned stimuli (CSs), which indicate the occurrence of a
nearby reinforcer (unconditioned stimuli or UCs) via dopaminergic reward prediction
error (RPE) signals. The incentive salience theory of addiction therefore suggests,
that drugs of abuse including alcohol produce incremental neuroadaptations in the
dopaminergic system which cause hypersensitivity to alcohol associated stimuli, mak-
ing them attractive, ”wanted” stimuli (Robinson and Berridge, 1993).
2.1.2 Pavlovian-to-instrumental Transfer
Alcohol related cues not only elicit arousal and approach responses in AD patients
but can also gain control over behavior. Indeed, it was shown that alcohol cues may
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foster alcohol consumption and craving in humans (Litt et al., 2000; McCusker and
Brown, 1990). In animals, alcohol-cues have been further shown to contribute to
relapse by reinstating drug-seeking behavior (Katner et al., 1999; Crombag et al.,
2008; Glasner et al., 2005). Thus, Pavlovian cues can exert control over previously
instrumentally acquired responses, a behavioral phenomenon termed Pavlovian-to-
instrumental Transfer (PIT). The PIT phenomenon has been descibed in two distinct
versions: outcome-general and outcome-specific (Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Talmi et al.,
2008; Corbit and Balleine, 2005). In specific PIT, cues are associated with a specific
reward and enhance instrumental actions for the same reward (e.g. alcohol associ-
ated stimuli increase responding for alcohol). In general PIT, however, cues that are
related to one reward enhance responses for a different reward (e.g. alcohol associ-
ated stimuli enhance instrumental responding for food). At least in animals, chronic
alcohol intake enhances both versions of PIT: Rats that were sensitized to alcohol
show increased instrumental responding for alcohol when confronted with alcohol
cues (Krank, 2003; Glasner et al., 2005; Corbit and Janak, 2007; Krank et al., 2008;
Milton et al., 2012; Lamb et al., 2016), an exemplification for specific PIT effects.
Moreover, chronic alcohol intake enhances the extent to which alcohol cues influence
responding for alternative rewards (e.g. food; Glasner et al. 2005; Corbit and Janak
2007), which can be seen as a conceptualization of general PIT. As chronic drug in-
take, such as alcohol also enhance the extent to which food-cues control food-related
responses (Ostlund et al., 2014), it was concluded that drug exposure causes alter-
ations in general reward and decision mechanisms.
Although several studies have sucessfully developped experimental paradigms to study
PIT effects in humans (Pre´vost et al., 2012; Bray et al., 2008; Trick et al., 2011; Talmi
et al., 2008), comparably little work has yet been conducted in the clinical field. In
smokers, Hogarth et al. (2007) and Hogarth and Chase (2011) demonstrated that
the presence of cigarette cues increases responses for cigarettes. Moreover in a sub-
clinical cohort, social drinkers showed increased responding for alcohol when alcohol
cues were present (Martinovic et al., 2014; Van Dyke and Fillmore, 2015). So far,
no study has investigated whether alcohol cues or other reward-related stimuli in-
crease instrumental responding in AD subjects. Such investigation could shed light
on habits in terms of incentive salience attribution and its impact on action selection
in human AD.
2.1.3 Disruption of goal-directed control in AD
Besides the above mentioned phenomena, which describe that Pavlovian stimuli may
trigger maladaptive responses and exert control over behavior, habits in AD have
4
been further mapped to a disruption of goal-directed control. Goal-directed con-
trol typically reflects two mental representations, (a) the knowledge of the outcome
that an action produces and (b) the current motivation for this outcome (Dickin-
son and Balleine, 1994). Thus, chronic alcohol intake might elicit inadequate mental
representation of action-outcome contingencies and/or actions that are incongruent
with the need and desire for the outcome. Although the nature of the underlying
processes remains unclear, in animals it was demonstrated, that repeated ethanol
exposure leads to a disruption in goal-directed control. Evidence for this mainly
derives from devaluation paradigms, in which the execution of a response, that has
previously led to reward, is tested after the reward has been devalued for instance
by pairing it with sickness. Dickinson and Balleine (2002) demonstrated that behav-
ior reinforced by alcohol was more resistant to devaluation than behavior that had
been reinforced by food. Consistently, after chronic alcohol consumption, rats be-
come insensitive to devaluation of alcohol (Lopez et al., 2014) and food (Corbit et al.,
2012). Alcohol exposure thus might have a special propensity to establish automatic
actions that are insensitive to the value of the outcome to which they will lead. The
study by Dickinson and Balleine (2002) was translated to humans, as Hogarth et al.
(2012a) demonstrated that alcohol intake in healthy subjects produces behavior that
is resistant to outcome devaluation. However, this relates merely to acute alcohol
effects. Despite the growing body of literature in animals that investigate the effects
of chronic alcohol exposure on goal-directed control, in humans, so far there are a
limited number of studies investigating this link. Crucially, in patients, devaluation
studies, that test alcohol consumption after alcohol devaluation are unethical and the
use of non-alcohol digestive rewards in human devaluation studies limits the sample to
individuals who enjoy the specific food or drink options (Valentin et al., 2007; McKim
et al., 2016b). So far, only one study investigated goal-directed decision-making in
human AD subjects by using a task with abstract stimuli, that was inspired by de-
valuation paradigms from the animal literature. This study showed that AD subjects
displayed disruptions in goal-directed decision-making (Sjoerds et al., 2013). Just
recently, by using similar tasks, these findings have been translated to humans suf-
fering from other substance use disorders (SUD) (McKim et al., 2016a), including
cocaine (Ersche et al., 2016).
Taken together, there are several processes that potentially underly the shift from
goal-directed to habitual control in AD. Crucially, the three above mentioned phe-
nomena (Cue-triggered responses, PIT, devaluation sensitivity) that indicate this shift
are related to each other. For instance rats, that show a propensity to attribute in-
centive salience to cues are resistant to devaluation (Morrison et al., 2015) and those
rats who show strong PIT effects are less sensitive to outcome devaluation (Barker
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et al., 2014). Moreover, humans who demonstrate strong incentive salience attri-
bution show enhanced general PIT effects (Garofalo and di Pellegrino, 2015). The
relationship between these phenomena render a summary under the umbrella term a
psychological account of habits and goal-directed control plausible.
2.2 Goals and habits: a computational perspective
Beside the psychological account of habitual and goal-directed decision-making (see
2.1), the theoretical formulation of a multiple-control system has recently been ap-
plied to the field of reinforcement learning, an area of machine learning. In this
field, theory-driven mathematical algorithms model how systems (including humans)
can learn to choose actions that maximize reward and minimize punishment (Sut-
ton, 1998). These algorithms can then be used to simulate and reproduce human
decision-making. Crucially, These models were particularly powerful in characteriz-
ing maladaptive decision-making processes across several psychiatric disorders (Maia,
2009; Redish et al., 2007; Maia and Frank, 2011; Huys et al., 2016).
2.2.1 Model-based and model-free control
Two ends of a spectrum of these mathematical algorithms instantiate model-based
and model-free control, the computational dual-control framework which mirrors the
psychological distinction of goal-directed and habitual decision-making (Doya et al.,
2002; Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2006). Whereas the model-free system simply
learns which actions are followed by reward, it is also rigid and inflexible, just like the
psychological instantiation of habitual control. The model-based system, on the other
hand, uses knowledge to prospectively reason about the value of actions, which makes
it sensitive to sudden outcome changes, a hallmark of goal-directed control (Dolan and
Dayan, 2013). More precisely, model-free algorithms compute action-values according
to past and therefore ”cached” rewards but neglects environmental structures, such
as where a path in a maze leads. Model-based algorithms, on the other hand, use
these environmental structures and therefore enable flexible and adaptive decision-
making. In humans, this dual-control framework was experimentally conceptualized
by using multi-choice Markov decision tasks (Glascher et al., 2010; Doll et al., 2015),
which allow to quantify the balance between model-free and model-based control on
a trial by trial basis, for instance in the so-called Two-Step task (Daw et al., 2011).
By using this task, Daw et al. (2011) and Glascher et al. (2010) demonstrated that
human decision-making show imprints of both systems, although there is substan-
tial interindividual variability in the balance between them. As the psychological
dual-control framework of addiction suggests a shift from goal-directed to habitual
behavior, a theoretical translation into the computational dual-control counterpart
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proposes a predominance of model-free at the expense of model-based decision-making
in addiction (Dolan and Dayan, 2013). One advantage of reinforcement learning mod-
els is that they can capture several aspects of neural activity even though they are
not grounded in biophysiology. One prominent example is that temporal-difference
learning, a special case of model-free reinforcement learning, correctly predicts a
dopaminergic RPE signal (Eshel et al., 2015; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al.,
1997; Takahashi et al., 2016). Indeed, these RPE’s underly reward-seeking behavior in
healthy subjects (Pessiglione et al., 2006) and correlate with craving in AD (Deserno
et al., 2015). Several theoretical accounts have therefore suggested that alcohol-
related dopamine release augments the selection of a model-free decision-making sys-
tem that overselects actions leading to alcohol receipt (Redish, 2004; Dayan, 2009).
This decision-making bias might promote general inflexible responding beyond the
domain of alcohol seeking, such that action-selection is ultimately biased towards
model-free learning (Lawrence et al., 2009; Park et al., 2010). However, until now, a
predominance of the model-free at the expense of the model-based system in human
AD subjects has not been tested.
2.3 Psychological and computational perspective:
Theoretical and experimental integrations
Although the psychological and the computational dual-control framework have been
described as theoretical counterparts, so far only few studies have experimentally
tested this association. The investigation of factors that shift behavioral dominance
from one system to the other suggest that the same cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses are involved across both dual-system accounts. For instance, extensive train-
ing was demonstrated to shift model-based to model-free decision-making (Keramati
et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012) and goal-directed to habitual responding (Dick-
inson et al., 1983; Holland, 2004). Likewise, stress prompted habits in devaluation
tasks (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009; Schwabe et al., 2010) and impaired model-based
control (Radenbach et al., 2015; Otto et al., 2013b). Higher cognitive functions (see
Paper VI ) such as working memory were also associated with model-based control
(Otto et al., 2013a,b) and correlated with the individual ability to retain goal-directed
behavior (Collins and Frank, 2012). Recently, Friedel et al. (2014) and Gillan et al.
(2015) showed that individual differences in model-based learning as assessed by the
Two-Step Task were directly associated with participants’ devaluation sensitivity,
thus demonstrating that the computational and the psychological dual-control con-
structs are indeed related. The psychological multiple control framework of habits
and goal-directed behavior includes Pavlovian influences on choice behavior as in the
PIT phenomenon (see 2.1.2), and indeed, several theoretical papers have mapped the
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model-based/ model-free dichotomy on PIT effects (Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Dayan
and Berridge, 2014). Specific PIT effects have been suggested to stem from model-
based computations as it requires access to the sensory identity of the outcome paired
with the Pavlovian stimulus. General PIT, on the other side has been termed as
model-free, because the invigoration of the response by the Pavlovian stimulus does
not require a mental model of the outcome (Clark et al., 2012). However, this has
only been on theoretical grounds and so far it has not been experimentally tested
whether individual variation in the balance between model-free and model-based is
associated with PIT effects.
2.4 From goals to habits - cause or consequence of
chronic alcohol intake?
Alterations in the decision process in AD patients could, on the one hand, be a
consequence of chronic alcohol intake or, on the other hand, reflect a preexisting trait
marker, indexing the vulnerability for developing AD. In humans, studies in subjects
who are at risk for the development of AD support the latter hypothesis. One risk
factor for the development of AD is trait impulsivity, which predicts alcohol intake
in humans and animals (Grano¨ et al., 2004; Belin et al., 2008) . High impulsivity
is associated with several phenomena that reflect a transition from goal-directed to
habitual control: high impulsive individuals show decreased goal-directed behavior in
devaluation tasks (Hogarth et al., 2012b) and increased general PIT effects (Garofalo
and di Pellegrino, 2015). Moreover, impulsive traits correlated with disruptions in
model-based control (Gillan et al., 2016; Reiter et al., 2016).
Variability of dopamine genes are a further risk factor for the development of AD:
For instance the genetic polymorphisms of catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT)
was associated with AD (Kreek et al., 2005) as well as the balance between model-
based and model-free control (Doll et al., 2016). Further support for the notion that
interindividual variability in habitual at the expense of goal-directed control may be a
predictor for the development of AD come from animal studies. For instance, Flagel
et al. (2011, 2009, 2014) have shown, that animals, who show increased incentive
salience attribution to formerly neutral cues have a higher propensity to acquire
addictive-like behavior. Moreover, Barker et al. (2012, 2014) demonstrated that
high general PIT effects precedes excessive alcohol intake, which is insensitive to
devaluation and extinction. Crucially in theses studies, PIT effects were tested before
alcohol exposure, suggesting that habitual at the expense of goal-directed responding
indeed is an endophenotype for addiction vulnerability. So far, in humans it has yet
not been investigated whether a bias towards habitual at the expense of goal-directed
control is a preexisting cognitive vulnerability marker for the development of AD.
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3
Summary and Research Questions
As outlined in the previous chapter, AD is assumed to be associated with habitual
responding at the expense of goal-directed control. This assumption can be incorpo-
rated in two dual control frameworks - a psychological (see 2.1) and a computational
(see 2.2). The psychological dual control theory assumes that chronic alcohol intake
shifts action-selection from a mode when it is driven by internal representations of
needs and goals to a mode where it is automatically executed through external cues
(see 2.1.1). One phenomenon that captures this rather automatic execution of a pre-
viously acquired response by environmental cues is the PIT effect (see 2.1.2), which
has been widely tested in animals, but so far not in human AD subjects. Equiva-
lent to the psychological dual-framework, the computational account assumes that
chronic alcohol intake shifts action selection from a system where action-values are
computed based on a model of the environment (model-based) to a mode where these
computations are merely driven, by ”stamped-in” and therefore cached reward values
(model-free, see 2.2.1). This framework has been demonstrated to capture neural and
behavioral features of decision-making in animals and healthy human subjects, but
so far it has not been applied to human AD.
The clinical implications that both dual-framework accounts make are the same,
namely that action-selection in AD is inflexible and rigid. Indeed, there are strong
theoretical assumptions that both dual-control frameworks describe the same cog-
nitive phenomenon from different perspectives and the terminologies ”model-free”
vs. ”model-based” control are meanwhile used almost synonymous with the terms
”habitual” vs ”goal-directed. However, to date, it remains rather unclear whether
these dual-control frameworks are indeed related and how experimental paradigms,
that are assumed to instantiate these concepts are associated with each other (see
2.3). There is evidence, that a bias in the decision-making process towards habit-
ual, model-free decisions is not merely a consequence of but probably a cause for
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chronic alcohol intake (see 2.4). If this were to be the case, this decision-making bias
would be associated with alcohol intake in a subclinical sample. Here, I argue that
the investigation of habits in AD might benefit from the translation of theoretically
grounded experimental procedures that have been proven to depict habitual choice
behavior in animals. Moreover, experimental procedures that enable to investigate
choice behavior by mathematical algorithms might further shed light on the precise
computations that underly habits in human AD. Specifically, the present dissertation
aimed to use two paradigms to address the following questions:
1. Do Pavlovian stimuli exert greater control over instrumental decision-making
(PIT effect) in AD patients compared to healthy controls? Do these group
effects depend on the nature of the Pavlovian stimulus, e.g. whether they are
alcohol-related or not?
2. Do human AD patients show an over-reliance of the model-free at the expense
of a model-based decision-making system?
3. How does model-free vs. model-based and habitual vs. goal-directed control
relate to each other? In particular, is the individual variation in PIT effects
associated with the balance between model-free/ model-based control?
4. Is model-free at the expense of model-based decision-making a cause or a con-
sequence of AD? In particular, is alcohol consumption in young men associated
with the balance between model-based an model-free control?
This dissertation is publication oriented and the Questions 1,2,3 and 4 relate to
the papers I,II,III and IV respectively. The following chapters will describe the precise
methods on how these questions were addressed and the results of these investigations.
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4
Methods
4.1 Samples
The data of all four studies was collected for a bicentric study hosted at Charite´
Universita¨tsmedizin zu Berlin and Technische Universita¨t Dresden, Germany. The
study examines learning and habitization in AD (the LeAD study, funded by the
German Research Society (DFG)) and is headed by Prof. Dr. Dr. Heinz and Prof
Dr. Wittchen. Papers I and II are based on data from the piloting phase of the
LeAD study and included AD patients according to DSM-IV criteria. Crucially, at
the time of study participation, all patients were abstinent from alcohol for at least
three consecutive days and at most for 21 days. All healthy control subjects for
Paper I and II were carefully matched to the patients according to demographic
characteristics such as age, education and gender. Paper III and Paper IV are based
on data of the core study of the LeAD study. Paper III focused on analyzing two
healthy cohorts differing on their demographic characteristics. The young sample,
which served as a replication sample for Paper III was also used for Paper IV. All
papers were generated at different times and for each paper we included all available
data. Therefore sample sizes differ between papers, albeit they include partially
overlapping subjects.
4.2 Paradigms
The Lead study applies two distinct paradigms that allow to investigate habitual vs.
goal-directed control from the psychological and computational perspective, respec-
tively (see 2.1 and 2.2). In Paper I, we developed a PIT Task (Fig 1) whereas in
Paper II and IV we used the Two-Step Task (Fig 2), which allows to investigate
model-free and model-based control on a trial-by-trial basis. In Paper III we used
11
behavioral choice patterns from both tasks in order to investigate how both cognitive
mechanisms are related (see 1.3).
4.2.1 PIT Task
This task includes three critical phases:
A.) The instrumental training (Fig 1A), where subjects learn to respond to go-stimuli.
B.) The Pavlovian conditioning (Fig 1B), where subjects learn to associate neutral
stimuli (CSs) to certain outcomes (USs).
C.) The PIT part (Fig 1C), where subjects are asked to perform the previously ac-
quired instrumental response (A) in the presence of the Pavlovian stimuli (CSs from
B). Performance during this part was of major interest for Paper I and III. In this
part of the task, fractal background stimuli from part B were occasionally replaced
with alcoholic/water images (not shown here, but additionally analyzed in Paper 1 ).
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Figure 1: The PIT Paradigm
(A) Instrumental Training Subjects were instructed to collect shells by repeated
button presses, after which they received probabilistic feedback. Collection of ”Go-
shells” was monetarily rewarded in 80% but punished in 20% of all trials and vice
versa if not collected. Collection of ”No-Go shells” was punished in 80% and rewarded
in 20% of all trials and vice versa if not collected. Subjects performed a maximum
of 120 trials. (B) Pavlovian Conditioning At each trial, subjects saw a fractal
stimulus accompanied by the sound of a tone (compound CS). After a delay, a coin
stimulus (US) was presented. Subjects were instructed to be attentive on the CS-
US pairings. CS-US associations consisted of two CS paired with images of +2/+1
EUR coins, one CS paired with 0 EUR and two CS paired with -1/-2 EUR. Subjects
completed 80 trials. (C) PIT Part Each trial consisted of the presentation of
one of the previously learned shells (from A) superimposed on the fractals (from B).
Subjects were instructed to perform the instrumental task again (collect ”Go-shells”
but leave ”No-go shells”). No feedback was presented, but subjects were instructed
that their choices would influence their final monetary outcome. Subjects completed
90 trials with fractals in the background.
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4.2.2 Two-Step Task
This task consisted of 201 trials, each trial requiring two choices (Fig 2A). On each
trial, subjects had to perform an initial choice (gray stimuli). This choice then led to
one of two 2nd stage options (either green or yellow), where again one stimulus had
to be selected. The transition from first stage choices to the specific 2nd stage was
probabilistic: whereas one option on the first stage led frequently to the green 2nd
stage option (70%) but rarely to the yellow 2nd stage option (30%), the other first
stage choice was associated with frequent yellow 2nd stage visits (70%) but rare green
2nd stage visits (30%). After the 2nd stage choice, subjects were either monetarily
rewarded or not. All four second-stage payoff probabilities changed slowly over time.
Figure 2: The Two-Step Task
(A) Trial Configuration (B) Model-based vs. model-free predictions Choices
observed at first stage give inference on model-based vs. model-free control strate-
gies. Model-free decisions do not consider transition frequencies: Actions resulting
in immediate reward have higher probability to be repeated than actions which did
not end up being rewarded, independent of whether the first stage choice resulted
in a common or a rare second stage option. Thus, model-free decisions predict a
main effect of reward on the next first stage choice. Only model-based decisions take
transition probabilities into account. Here, the subject knows that reward omission
after rare transitions actually suggest that the first stage choice should be repeated
to increase the chance of getting to the opposing second stage stimulus pair. Thus,
model-based decisions predict an interaction between reward and transition on next
first stage choices.
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Overview of publications
5.1 Paper I
Garbusow, M., Schad, D. J., Sommer, C., Jnger, E., Sebold, M., Friedel, E., Wendt,
J., Kathmann, N., Schlagenhauf, F., Zimmermann, U. S., Heinz, A., Huys, Q. J.,
Rapp, M. A., 2014. Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer in alcohol dependence: a pilot
study.Neuropsychobiology 70 (2), 111-121.
The overarching aim of Paper I was to investigate whether PIT effects are in-
volved in AD. To this end, we implemented a PIT paradigm that mirrors previous
experimental manipulations from animal studies and compared task performance be-
tween detoxified AD subjects and healthy controls.
Theoretical background In animals, chronic alcohol intake increases the extent
to which reward-related stimuli exert control over choice behavior (Corbit and Janak,
2007; Ostlund et al., 2014; Glasner et al., 2005; Ostlund et al., 2014). This PIT phe-
nomenon is considered to underly cue-induced craving in AD and promote relapse
after detoxification (Barker et al., 2012; Lamb et al., 2016). However, in humans it
has yet not been tested if PIT effects were associated with AD.
HypothesesWe adapted a recent experiment to study PIT effects in humans (Geurts
et al., 2013; Huys et al., 2011), which allows to investigate the effects that alcohol
and other reward-related cues have on instrumental behavior (Fig 1C for PIT with
other reward-related cues). Based on the above mentioned findings, we hypothesized
that patients with AD show stronger PIT effects both for stimuli predicting monetary
outcomes and alcohol-related pictures.
Major findings As hypothesized and in line with animal models (Ostlund et al.,
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2014), AD patients compared to healthy controls tended to show increased PIT effects
towards cues that had previously been reinforced with non-alcoholic reward (money).
Alcohol-associated stimuli also exerted increased control over instrumental choice be-
havior in AD patients compared to healthy controls. However, in the presence of
alcohol-associated stimuli, this effect was driven by avoidance rather than approach
behavior. This effect in AD might reflect some sort of goal-directed control as conse-
quence of cognitive reappraisal of alcohol-associated cues during detoxification.
5.2 Paper II
Sebold, M., Deserno, L., Nebe, S., Schad, D. J., Garbusow, M., Hagele, C., Keller,J.,
Junger, E., Kathmann, N., Smolka, M., Rapp, M. A., Schlagenhauf, F., Heinz, A.,
Huys, Q. J., 2014. Model-based and model-free decisions in alcohol dependence. Neu-
ropsychobiology 70 (2), 122-131.
Paper II aimed to investigate whether AD is associated with habitual respond-
ing at the expense of goal-directed control. A main goal was to investigate this shift
from a computational perspective (see 2.2), which equates habits with model-free and
goal-directed with model-based control.
Theoretical background Chronic alcohol exposure may foster automatic actions
that are insensitive to sudden value changes (Dickinson et al., 2000). This is remi-
niscent of model-free algorithms, where action-values are only slowly updated (Huys
et al., 2016). Likewise, chronic alcohol may impair complex and flexible decision-
making (Park et al., 2010; Lawrence et al., 2009), which can be computationally
modelled by model-based algorithms that take complex action-outcome contingencies
into account. However, to date a shift from model-based to model-free control in
human AD has only been made on theoretical grounds and not yet been tested.
Hypotheses By using the Two-Step task, which allows to investigate the individ-
ual balance between model-free and model-based control, we tested whether there
is a shift from model-based to model-free control in AD. Particularly, we expected
AD patients compared to healthy controls to show increased model-free, habitual re-
sponding but reduced goal-directed, model-based action-selection.
Major findings Contrary to our prediction, AD patients did not show increased
model-free control. However, in line with our hypothesis, we found a reduction of
model-based control in AD. This alteration in the patient group was associated with
a lack of behavioral adjustment after non-rewards, which is line with studies demon-
strating impairments of adaptive decision-making after losses in AD (Lawrence et al.,
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2009). Crucially, model-based impairments in the patient group were attenuated
when adjusting for general cognitive capacities, suggesting that model-based control
relies on higher cognitive functions.
5.3 Paper III
Sebold, M., Schad, D. J., Nebe, S., Garbusow, M., Jnger, E., Kroemer, N. B.,
Kathmann, N., Zimmermann, U. S., Smolka, M. N., Rapp, M. A., Heinz, A., Huys,
Q.J.M, 2016. Don’t think, just feel the music: Individuals with strong Pavlovian-to-
Instrumental Transfer effects rely less on model-based reinforcement learning. Journal
of cognitive neuroscience 28 (7), 985-995.
Paper III investigated whether individual variation in PIT effects was related to
the balance between model-based and model-free control. Particularly, as PIT effects
relate to the psychological and model-free/model-based speech to the computational
dual-control framework of decision-making, this study provides insight on how both
theoretical accounts relate to a common phenomenon.
Theoretical background As we have recently demonstrated in Paper I and II
of this dissertation, human AD subjects show increased PIT effects but a reduction
in model-based control. Moreover, animal studies have shown that individuals who
show strong PIT effects and incentive salience attribution are insensitive to deval-
uation (Morrison et al., 2015), hence less goal-directed. However, the association
between individual variation in PIT effects and the balance between model-free and
model-based decision-making has yet not experimentally been tested in humans.
Hypotheses Based on the above mentioned animal findings and in line with our find-
ings from Paper I and II, we expected that subjects with high PIT effects (Fig 1C)
to show increased model-free but decreased model-based behavior in the Two-Step
task (Fig 2A)
Major findings In line with what we expected, individuals with strong PIT ef-
fects relied less on model-based reinforcement learning. This pattern was evident
in two independent samples and was confirmed by reaction time (RT) analyses and
computational models. Contrary to several theoretical papers (Dolan and Dayan,
2013; Dayan and Berridge, 2014), we did not find evidence for an association between
PIT effects and model-free control per se. This null effect is in line with our findings
from Paper II and suggests that the Two-Step task does not have much power to
detect variations in the model-free domain.
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5.4 Paper IV
Nebe, S., Kroemer, N.B., Schad, D.J. Bernhardt, N., Sebold, M., Mller, D.K., Scholl,
L, Kuitunen-Paul, S., Heinz, A., Rapp M.A., Huys, Q.J.M, Smolka, M.N.(under Re-
view at Addiction biology): No association of goal-directed and habitual control with
alcohol consumption in young adults.
Based on our findings from Paper II that AD is associated with a reduction in
model-based control, the major aim of Paper IV was to investigate whether this
altered decision-making pattern was a preexisting trait that indexes alcohol con-
sumption before chronic alcohol intake. As early alcohol use is a risk factor for adult
AD (Grant et al., 2006; Hingson and Zha, 2009), we tested whether the imbalance
between model-free and model-based control was associated with early alcohol con-
sumption in a sample of healthy 18 year-old men.
Theoretical background Several animal studies have suggested that alterations
in the decision-process predate the onset of addiction (Belin et al., 2008). Particu-
larly, model-free at the expense of model-based decisions has been suggested to serve
as a vulnerability marker for addiction development (Story et al., 2014; Keramati
et al., 2012). On a neural level, activity of the ventral striatum (VS) and the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) modulate the balance between model-based and model-free
control (Daw et al., 2011). So far, it has not been tested whether the balance between
both systems and its neural correlates is associated with alcohol consumption before
excessive alcohol intake.
Hypotheses We expected current alcohol consumption in young healthy adults to
correlate with the balance between model-based and model-free control. More pre-
cisely, we hypothesized young subjects with increased alcohol intake to demonstrate
a shift from model-based to model-free control. We further assumed that these be-
havioral alterations would be accompanied by increased model-free but decreased
model-based neural signatures.
Major findings On a behavioral level, the balance between model-free and model-
based decision-making was not associated with alcohol consumption. Furthermore,
alcohol consumption was not related to neural correlates of model-free or model-based
control in the VS or mPFC. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that early onset
of drinking was associated with increased model-free signatures in the posterior puta-
men. These results suggest that an imbalance between model-based and model-free
control might rather develop as a consequence of chronic alcohol intake than being a
trait marker of alcohol intake per se.
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6
Discussion
In the following chapter, I will summarize the findings of all studies and integrate
them into existing knowledge and the debate about a shift from goal-directed to
habitual control in AD.
6.1 Summary and Evaluation
6.1.1 AD patients show increased habits but reduced goal-
directed control
Several animal studies have suggested that chronic alcohol consumption shifts be-
havioral control from goal-directed to habitual mode. It is yet unclear whether this
relates to humans. In Paper I and Paper II we addressed this question by measur-
ing habitual vs. goal-directed decision-making using two different paradigms. The
paradigm we used in Paper I was strongly influenced by findings in animal studies,
which indicate that chronic AD increases the extent to which Pavlovian cues exert
control over a previously acquired instrumental response (PIT). In this dissertation,
I argue that the PIT phenomenon relates to the psychological framework of habitual
control. In Paper II, we used an experiment that enables the investigation of model-
free and model-based decision-making - the computational instantiation of habitual
and goal-directed control. Results from both papers partially confirm our hypothesis
that AD is associated with a shift from goal-directed to habitual control.
Paper I: PIT Effects in AD
In Paper I we observed that compared to healthy controls, a proportional higher
number of AD patients showed a significant PIT effect towards stimuli, which were
associated with monetary outcomes. In a recent study of our group (Paper V), we
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extended these findings by showing that AD patients showed a more pronounced mag-
nitude of those PIT effects. These findings are in accordance with animal studies,
which show, that chronic alcohol intake increases value attribution to cues (Ostlund
et al., 2014; Krank, 2003). The cues we used in Paper I and Paper V were associated
with money rather than alcohol outcomes. However, several studies in animals have
shown that chronic alcohol intake particularly increases the impact that alcohol cues
exert on choice behavior. Therefore in Paper I, we additionally assessed the question
whether AD was associated with increased PIT effects towards alcohol cues. In line
with our results on PIT effects towards monetary cues, we found that alcohol-stimuli
exerted stronger control over choice behavior in AD subjects compared to healthy
controls. However, unlike monetary cues, alcohol cues appeared to suppress rather
than enhance instrumental responding. In a recent paper of our group (Paper VII), we
replicated this finding. These results suggest that alcohol-cues in our PIT task might
have been aversive to AD patients rather than appetitive, which contradicts with
some findings and theories (Carter and Tiffany, 1999; Berridge, 2012). In patients,
it is plausible that explicit alcohol cognitions instead of implicit value attributions to
alcohol-cues inhibited responding. All patients had recently gone through detoxifica-
tion. Interventions during detoxification typically target explicit alcohol cognitions,
so they are ultimately negative. Therefore decreased responding towards alcohol cues
in the here applied task might not reflect PIT effects, in the sense of implicit habits.
Instead action selection in the patient group seemed to be under control of explicit
cognitions, which is a hallmark of goal-directed control. If this was the case, suppres-
sion towards alcohol cues in patients would potentially reflect treatment effectiveness
and therefore serve as a resilience factor for relapse. Indeed, in our recent study (Pa-
per VII), we observed that reduced responding in the presence of alcohol cues were
particularly apparent in patients who successfully remained abstinent from alcohol
during the follow-up period, while this was not the case in prospective relapsers.
Taken together, in Paper I, we were able to observe increased control of monetary-
cues over instrumental behavior in AD. However, instrumental responding towards
Pavlovian alcohol-cues may not reflect habitual but rather goal-directed responding
in patients. The application of computational models that assume a hierarchical or-
ganization of habitual and goal-directed control might help to elucidate how both
mechanisms interact in AD (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013; Iglesias et al., 2013). More-
over, future studies should investigate non-treatment seeking AD patients in order
to see whether goal-directed responding towards alcohol cues is only apparent after
detoxification treatment.
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Paper II: Model-free and Model-based decisions in AD
In Paper II, we approached the question about a shift from goal-directed to ha-
bitual control in AD from a computational perspective. In line with other studies
that have tested this hypothesis with other tasks (Sjoerds et al., 2013; Ersche et al.,
2016; McKim et al., 2016a), we demonstrated that AD is associated with a shift
away from model-based decision strategies, the computational instantiation of goal-
directed control. We did not evidence an increase in habitual, model-free behavior,
which we had originally assumed. One recent study has suggested that the here ap-
plied Two-Step task does not have much power to detect variations in the model-free
system (Doll et al., 2016). In line with this assumption, several other studies found
that a variety of experimental manipulations would exclusively affect model-based
control but not the model-free system in the Two-Step Task (Eppinger et al., 2013;
Otto et al., 2013b; Worbe et al., 2015). In our study, disruptions in the model-based
domain in patients were particularly apparent when subjects had to adapt their be-
havior after trials where no reward was delivered. This result is in line with other
studies demonstrating that chronic alcohol intake reduces behavioral adaptation af-
ter negative outcomes (Ersche et al., 2016) and suggests that alcohol mainly impairs
behavioral adaptation after punishment (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; Lawrence et al.,
2009).
Shortly after Paper II was published, another study used the Two-Step Task to in-
vestigate the shift between model-based and model-free control in methamphetamine
dependent and AD subjects (Voon et al., 2015). Whereas this study found evidence
of a disruption in model-based control in methamphetamine-dependent subjects, AD
patients did not differ from healthy controls regarding model-free or model-based
choice strategies. Because sample sizes between Paper II and Voon et al. (2015) were
comparable, the null result in Voon et al. (2015) can not be attributed to reduced
statistical power. Instead, differences in abstinence duration in the AD cohorts be-
tween Paper II and Voon et al. (2015) may have resulted in contradictory results:
whereas AD patients in Paper II were abstinent for a maximum of 5 weeks, the max-
imal abstinence time in the Voon study was one year. Indeed, in the Voon study,
weeks of abstinence were positively correlated with increases in model-based control,
suggesting that impairments in model-based control might be a transient and acute
consequence of chronic alcohol intake, which regularizes with prolonged abstinence.
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6.1.2 Computational and psychological phenomena: Over-
laps
In this thesis, I have argued that there are several phenomena, that characterize a
shift from goal-directed to habitual decision mode. Essentially, I assume that some
phenomena (PIT, incentive salience attribution, devaluation sensitivity) relate to the
psychological dual-control framework whereas others (model-free/model-based con-
trol) are associated with the computational account and that both accounts reflect
related phenomena. The paradigmatic overlap of various phenomena that capture
the psychological account has been demonstrated: PIT effects predict resistance to
outcome devaluation (Barker et al., 2014), incentive salience attribution is associated
with enhanced PIT effects (Garofalo and di Pellegrino, 2015) and decreased devalua-
tion sensitivity (Morrison et al., 2015). In Paper III, we addressed the yet unanswered
question how PIT effects relate to the computational framework of model-free and
model-based control. As stated in 6.1.1. AD patients show enhanced PIT effects and
reductions in model-based control. In accordance with these findings, we demonstrate
that healthy subjects who show strong PIT effects towards monetary cues also show
less model-based control. This finding adds to two other studies, which use the here
applied Two-Step Task and a devaluation task to demonstrate that the computational
and the psychological dual control framework are related (Friedel et al., 2014; Gillan
et al., 2015). Furthermore, our finding from Paper III suggests a common underlying
substrate for Pavlovian interference and disruptions in model-based control.
6.1.3 Reductions in model-based control: a trait disposition
to AD?
One important topic in the research on human AD is the unresolved causality dilemma,
which is due to the correlative and cross-sectional nature of most human studies.
Thus, it remains unclear whether the described shift from goal-directed to habitual
decision-making in AD reflects a consequence of long-term drinking or a preexisting
trait may serve as a vulnerability marker for AD. In order to address this question,
the Lead study applies a longitudinal design and in Paper IV we have analyzed the
first assessment cycle of a young healthy cohort of male subjects, who had started
to consume alcohol just recently. As certain habitual decision-making phenotypes
have been suggested to lead to early and numerous encounters with alcohol (Story
et al., 2014; Montague et al., 2012), in Paper IV we aimed to test whether alco-
hol consumption in young adults was associated with a shift from model-based and
model-free control. Some neuroimaging studies have shown that alcohol consumption
in young adults is associated with increased neural responses in the striatum, which
has been associated with habitual control (Dager et al., 2013; Brumback et al., 2015)
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and decreased activity in prefrontal areas associated with goal-directed control (Whe-
lan et al., 2014; Squeglia et al., 2011). Therefore we had assumed that current and
past alcohol intake in our sample of young adults would reflect these neural response
pattern. However, we could not substantiate our behavioral nor our neural hypoth-
esis. This finding is in line with a recent study where individual drinking pattern
in a subclicical cohort were neither associated with habitual behavior, as indexed by
individual PIT effects nor it’s electrophysiological correlates (Martinovic et al., 2014).
Furthermore our results of Paper IV suggest that the transition from goal-directed
to habitual control, as seen in Paper I and Paper II occurs during later steps on the
path to AD rather than being a preexisting trait marker for alcohol use.
6.2 Limitations
The here presented studies bear some limitations. First of all I will refer to conceptual
and theoretical problems of the habit approach in SUD. Then, I will address the most
significant methodological limitations of our studies and relate the conclusion of our
findings to potential avenues for future research.
6.2.1 Habits in addiction: Conceptual and theoretical prob-
lems
There is accumulating evidence that addiction is not uniquely characterized by au-
tomatic actions, which are disentangled from the anticipatory effects of the action’s
consequences. Instead, some form of addictive behavior is truly goal-directed. This
becomes particularly apparent in situations where SUD individuals apply complex se-
quences of actions in order to purchase the drug. Furthermore, it has been discussed,
whether drug taking behavior which is preluded by subjective craving should be la-
beled as goal-directed actions, as drug taking then underlies it’s motivational under-
pinnings (Sjoerds et al., 2014). On the other hand, craving in SUD has been suggested
to reflect a rather automatic and reflexive response, that is stimulus bound - the hall-
mark of habitual control (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Heinz et al., 2009). Thus,
albeit drug purchase and consumption might be executed in a goal-directed manner,
the initiation of these action sequences might still underly habitual responses. Indeed,
there are several studies (including Paper I, in which we found that PIT responses
towards alcohol cues in AD may be goal-directed rather than habitual), which suggest
that goal-directed processes still play a major role in addiction (Root et al., 2009; Hog-
arth and Chase, 2011; Olmstead et al., 2001). One limitation of our studies is, that
we did not investigate the above mentioned potentially goal-directed phenomena in
addiction (namely: drug seeking and intake). Instead we examined general reward re-
lated instrumental choices. Whereas in animals, drug seeking is often experimentally
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induced and drug intake can be objectively quantified, in humans there are ethical
limitations that restrict the experimental evocation of drug-related actions and crav-
ing and intake mostly rely on subjective reports of the patients. Thus, the tasks
used in this dissertation and elsewhere in humans (Ersche et al., 2016; Voon et al.,
2015; McKim et al., 2016b) use non-drug related rewards, whereas previous rodent
studies that have shown a bias towards habitual control after chronic alcohol intake
used alcohol rewards (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Lopez et al., 2014; Corbit et al.,
2012). Moreover, human behavior is more complex than observed in laboratory ro-
dent experiments, where animals are extensively trained. Thus, the translation from
animal to human behavior (and vice versa) remains a crucial challenge and distinct
findings between the two research subjectives should be treated with caution.
6.2.2 Methodological limitations
Our first methodological limitation refers to sample size restrictions. This problem
particularly refers to Paper I and II, where we analyzed behavioral pilot data of
the LeAD study and the results of both studies remain to be replicated in inde-
pendent and larger samples. As for Paper I, we were able to replicate our finding,
that reward-related monetary cues elicited increased approach responding (Paper V),
whereas alcohol cues elicited suppression of approach responding (Paper VII). A more
fundamental methodological limitation of Paper I is, that the PIT paradigm as ap-
plied here leads to a positive skewed distribution of individual PIT effects. Thus,
many subjects did not show PIT effects at all, a finding we had not expected based
on previous studies using a similar version of the paradigm (in Huys et al. (2011),
98% of all subjects showed a positive PIT effect). This skewed distribution limited
our statistical approaches in Paper I. Moreover one limitation of Paper I was, that
our experimental manipulation did not allow to disentangle between outcome-specific
and outcome-general PIT (see 2.1.2). This was the case, because we had only one
common outcome in the instrumental and the Pavlovian conditioning part, which was
money. Recent studies in humans have introduced experimental manipulations that
allow to disentangle both phenomena (Pre´vost et al., 2012; Lewis et al., 2013) and
future studies should investigate both PIT versions in human SUD including AD.
Beside the sample size restrictions, a methodological limitation of Paper II was, that
our finding of decreased model-based control in AD patients was confounded with
decreased neuropsychological testing scores in the patient group. Indeed, when we
controlled for interindividual differences in processing speed (digit symbol substitution
test: DSST), our group differences in model-based control were no longer significant.
We have recently shown that processing speed was associated with model-based con-
trol in healthy subjects (Paper VI), a finding which has been replicated (Reiter et al.,
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2016; Gillan et al., 2016). Deficits in the DSST test in AD patients are a common
finding (Davies et al., 2005) and there is a wide debate on whether it is appropriate to
control for substantive group differences on variables which are seen as features rather
than confounds of the psychopathology (Miller and Chapman, 2001). Therefore, we
do not think our results of decreased model-based control in AD are invalid. Instead
our findings suggest that AD is associated with alterations in several, potentially as-
sociated cognitive subdomains, including model-based control and processing speed.
One further limitation of Paper II relates to the experimental procedure, as one re-
cent computational study demonstrated that model-based control in the Two Step
Task does not improve accuracy. Therefore the application of additional cognitive
capacity, which is needed in model-based decision-making might not pay off for the
individual (Kool et al., 2016). These researchers have suggested an alternative task
to solve this problem and future studies should apply this task to the clinical field.
In Paper III, where we associated individual PIT effects with model-based control, we
analyzed data of two samples, which markedly differed regarding their demographic
characteristics: The exploration sample contained middle aged healthy controls, the
replication sample consisted of a homogeneous sample of 18 year old male subjects.
We found a negative association between PIT effects and model-based control across
both samples, although the association between both phenomena was stronger in the
exploration sample. One limitation of Paper III was, that both samples markedly dif-
fered in their behavior across both tasks: Young subjects showed pronounced model-
based control but low PIT effects, while older subjects particularly relied on model-
free control in the Two-Step task and showed higher PIT effects. Whereas there is
evidence that age reduces model-based control (Eppinger et al., 2013), there is to
date no evidence that age increases PIT effects. Both samples might have differed
in non demographic variables that we did not control for, such as stress or trait im-
pulsivity, as assessed by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995). Both
of these variables were shown to enhance PIT effects but decrease model-based con-
trol (Morgado et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2013b; Deserno et al., 2015; Garofalo and
di Pellegrino, 2015). Future studies can more specifically control for these potentially
confounding effects. One second limitation of Paper III was that we followed a cor-
relational approach where we associated individual behavior across two independent
tasks rather than experimentally manipulating behavior within one task, as previ-
ously shown (Otto et al., 2013a; Gillan et al., 2015). Future studies should therefore
additionally assess the influence that Pavlovian stimuli exert over model-based be-
havior.
All studies presented here applied a cross sectional design. At least in Paper IV
this factor precludes us from reasoning that model-based disruptions do not reflect a
predisposing vulnerability marker for increased alcohol intake. This conclusion can
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exclusively been drawn from longitudinal designs, e.g. by demonstrating that sub-
jects show decreased model-based control after they had started to consume increased
levels of alcohol, but showed no such alterations prior to alcohol intake. One of the
overarching aims of the LeAD study is to apply these longitudinal approaches and
will hopefully shed light on these unresolved chicken-egg problems.
6.3 Future Directions and Conclusions
6.3.1 Clinical implications
One important challenge of fundamental clinical studies is the translation into clinical
practice. Our findings from Paper I and II have major clinical implications.
Study I demonstrated that behavior in AD patients after detoxification is likely to
be controlled by reward predictive cues. This finding has twofold implications for
psychotherapeutic interventions: First of all, the identification of healthy activities
(physical exercise, performing music, create arts), that are experienced as rewarding
but are non-alcohol related seems crucial. Cognitive appraisal (Connors et al., 1996)
can help to increase the value of these healthy behaviors and decrease the value of un-
desired activities, such as alcohol consumption. Consequently, the repeated execution
of healthy activities could establish PIT effects, such that environmental situations
in which these behaviors are executed automatically promote them in the future.
Second, the identification of environmental cues that are individually perceived as
rewarding are important. Euthymic therapy (Lutz, 2005; Kiermeir et al., 2012) may
help to further increase the value of these cues. Consequently, these environments
could help to facilitate the execution of desired behavioral strategies. One example
for this is, that listening to music might help to do physical exercise, which has been
argued to prevent relapses (Lynch et al., 2013) as it reduces alcohol craving (Ussher
et al., 2004).
Our finding from Paper II holds further promises for treatments for AD. As we
evidenced disruptions in goal-directed decision-making in AD, psychotherapeutic in-
terventions should include the exercise of goal-directed strategies. Indeed, this is part
of cognitive behavioral therapy, as in the S-O-R-C model (Kanfer and Saslow, 1965),
where the affected individuals learn to actively store and retrieve a mental model on
how they should alternatively react to craving inducing stimuli.
6.3.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates that AD is associated with several habit-
related phenomena, such as increased PIT effects and reductions in model-based
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control. Moreover, in a healthy cohort these phenomena were associated with each
other (in the way that subjects with high PIT effects showed low model-based control),
suggesting that they involve similar cognitive mechanisms. Future studies should
use neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques along with these paradigms to
further elucidate the precise mechanism that are altered in AD and to further clinical
treatment strategies. Moreover, longitudinal studies involving at risk populations, as
well as non-abstinent AD subjects are needed to answer the question whether habitual
decision-making relates to a trait marker of AD or a transient state marker tracking
clinical fluctuations over time.
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